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Jean Georges Daou 
In the study, I examine the concept of personhood in light of developments 
in the practice of medicine during the latter half of the twentieth century. To this 
end, I offer a brief historical examination of medical practice during this time with a 
special focus on the relationship between a physician and a patient. I also consider 
some of the main contemporary legal and philosophical notions used to 
characterize personhood today. Subsequently, I conclude that most fail to 
sufficiently consider the person, as a being, in its entirety. 
I suggest the human person is created to be in relationship. It is within those 
bonds that connect us to each other that persons come into being as unique 
individuals that act in the world, or more precisely, as beings being-in-the-world. 
Therefore, I suggest that identity and relationality are essential components of 
personhood. Consequently, I propose is that a model which would allow for the 
narratives and personal relationships that act in defining who we are as persons is 
necessary, and that to deny the narrative is to dissociate the person from his 
identity. 
Properly framed, such an existential discussion is at once psychological, 
sociological, historical, philosophical, theological, religious and spiritual. It 
necessarily requires a framework within which this dialogue can occur. I draw this 
structure from the writings of Bernard Lonergan. 
iii 
Dedication 
In loving memory 
Vaughn Thomassin 
(April 4th, 1965 - November 2nd, 2009) 
l/l/e can't anticipate the obstacles that might arise 
And yet I see the sun still shines as I look in your eyes 
We may have to push harder, or wait, unexpectedly 
But we keep on moving nonetheless, like waves upon the sea 
The journey isn't over though the train has been delayed 
There is still life within our dreams and all the plans we've made 
Don't let the current circumstance tell you that hope is gone 
For when the sun does rise again, our life will still go on 
Thinking of you! 






















"Ethics concerns the needs and values of human persons. Health 
is a vital human need; nothing is more human, more personal, and 
must always be one of the main concerns of any human community. 
To develop an ethics of human care, therefore, we must have an 
accurate notion of what it means to be human and what it means to 
be a healthy human. "1 
In the following, I outline a brief history of the transformations that have 
occurred in the practice of medicine during the second half of the twentieth century 
and how they may have affected the personal relationship between the personal 
physician and a patient, as well as the relationship between the field of medicine 
and society as a whole. I also examine some of the prevailing contemporary 
concepts advanced to define personhood in traditional ethics. I conclude that none 
are adequate in explicitly considering the whole person, and I propose that what is 
needed is a concept that would allow room for the narratives and personal 
1
 Benedict M. Ashley et al, Health Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological Analysis." 5th ed (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 31. 
1 
relationships that go a long way in defining who we are as persons. In fact, to deny 
the narrative is to dissociate the person from his identity. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the practice of medicine 
experienced a significant transformation which has profoundly affected the 
relationship between doctor and patient and, by extension, between medicine and 
the society it serves.2 The character of this transformation is exemplified in the 
changes that have occurred in the medical decision-making process, which has 
been summarized as: "[...] the discretion that the profession once enjoyed has 
been increasingly circumscribed, with an almost bewildering number of parties and 
procedures participating in the decision making."3 
Prior to this transformation, decisions about medical care were largely the 
exclusive domain of the individual physician, even when they raised vital ethical 
and social concerns. For the most part, it was physicians who deliberated 
2
 For this discussion, I rely heavily on: David J.Rothman. Stranger at the Bedside: A History of 
How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making. (La Vergne: TN, 1991). 1-
14. 
On the issue of experimentation on human subjects, regulations were in place as early as 
1900 in Germany. For a more complete discussion see: Jochen Vollmann and Rolf Winau. 
"The Prussian Regulation of 1900: Early Standards for Human Experimentation in 
Germany" IRB: Ethics and Human Research, Vol. 18, No.4 (Jul. - Aug., 1996), pp. 9-11.; 
Hans-Martin Sass. "Reichsrundschreiben 1931: Pre-Nuremburg German Regulations 
Concerning New Therapy and Human Experimentation." The Journal of Philosophy and 
Medicine 8 (1983), 99-111. 
3
 David J.Rothman. Stranger at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics 
Transformed Medical Decision Making. (La Vergne: TN, 1991), 1. 
2 
questions concerning the morality of withholding or withdrawing treatment, 
experimenting on human subjects or the allocation of resources. More often than 
not, these choices would be made in the privacy of the bedside or hospital room 
without the scrutiny of other physicians, legal experts or professional philosophers. 
Moreover, decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis with the physician 
reacting to each specific case as they saw fit, disinclined to formulate or hold to 
guidelines or rules. 
In concrete terms, it was the physician at the bedside who would: decide to 
withhold a course of antibiotics, and allowing pneumonia to serve as an old man's 
best friend; consider an infant born with serious defects as a stillbirth, thus sparing 
the parents the distress of choosing between allowing their baby to die or a lifetime 
of burdensome care; experiment on institutionalized mental patients to learn more 
about hepatitis; or decide who will or will not have access to an iron lung when the 
machines were in short supply. 
This customary image of a physician alone with a patient and all that it 
entailed, has been replaced by a space, both real and metaphorical, so crowded 
with: technicians, and specialists, with their equipment and technology; and 
lawyers, judges, legislators, academics, ethics committees and hospital 
administrators with their rules, regulations and laws governing practice, that the 
personal physician had difficulty squeezing into the room of a patient surrounded 
by strangers. However appropriate the restructuring of the patient-doctor 
relationship may be, it has also served to distance the patient from the traditional 
3 
personal connection to the health-care system. The effect is a depersonalization of 
the system and the persons whom it serves. This depersonalization has also 
affected the way persons are viewed, characterized and understood, shifting the 
locus of thought on the subject from the religious/theological to the legal/medical. 
As the title of this paper suggests, what I am advocating here is an ethical 
understanding of the person. 
As I began this thesis, I intended to examine the ethical issues that 
surround the end of life. As I researched, I began to realize that isolating the final 
episode in a human life from the entirety of that life is not only difficult, but also not 
very helpful. The turning point was when I came across an article entitled "Some 
must die" in which Stuart J. Youngner discusses the difficult ethical and 
psychosocial issues that arise in the context of "controlled" death for the purpose 
of organ transplantation, including the distortion of boundaries between life and 
death, self and other, healing and harming, and killing and letting die. In this article, 
Youngner recounts the story of an eighteen year-old woman, Janet, who was 
twenty-two weeks pregnant when she suffered a spontaneous ruptured cerebral 
aneurysm. She was admitted to an ICU, where an unequivocal diagnosis of brain 
death was made within twenty-four hours. 
Here, nurses and physicians cared for dead mother and living 
foetus. Eight weeks later, a healthy baby was delivered by cesarean 
section, following which the young woman's heart, liver, pancreas, 
and kidneys were removed and transplanted into four waiting 
4 
patients, three of whom were cared for in the same ICU that had 
maintained the dead mother. 
Because the care of Janet was going to be both clinically and 
emotionally challenging (the first such case for the ICU), a small 
group of nurses volunteered to provide it. Heavily identified with the 
tragedy, they became very attached to both the dead mother and the 
living foetus, who had already been named. For many of the staff, 
taking care of the patient was a religious experience. Its mystical 
nature was enhanced by the fact that Janet had anticipated her 
death a week before it occurred, when she told her family that "if 
anything happens to me, I want them to do everything to save the 
baby." The ICU staff's mission was to bring a healthy baby out of the 
tragedy, and they constantly watched and worried over it. But they 
were also preoccupied with the baby's mother. 
One nurse described what the day-to-day care of Janet was like: 
"We kept her immaculately clean and neat, even had her mother 
bring in a silk robe in which to dress her. I washed her hair every 
week. It was long, beautiful red hair, and it grew for eight weeks. I 
could sense the presence of her soul in her body." Another nurse 
sensed the presence of a soul hovering over the body, "watching 
us." 
5 
The nurses developed rituals, including putting a picture of the 
dead mother on the wall. They played music in the room, "for the 
baby," but were convinced that the mother's heart rate changed in 
response to it. The physicians, who spent much less time with the 
patient (the nurses worked one-on-one with the patient in ten-hour 
shifts), were less emotionally involved, although one of the 
obstetricians was clearly convinced that "the whole thing [had] a 
preordained purpose." 
Not surprisingly, the medical staff constantly used speech 
indicating that the patient was alive. "Our job was to keep the mother 
alive until the baby was born," one physician told me. A nurse said, 
"We all knew she was dead, but we felt she was alive." The patient's 
mother told a physician, "Every time I leave, I think she is going to 
finally die, and each time I return to the ICU, she is still with us." 
What is reality for family members who watched the living body of 
a dead girl nurture, grow, and issue forth a healthy baby? While 
Janet's hair grew longer and the nurses washed and combed it, was 
6 
she really alive or dead to them? They could rationally say that she 
was dead and explain why; the signs of life told another story.4 
I found this story both intriguing and disturbing. I was intrigued by the 
responses Janet evoked in those involved in her care, by the compassion that the 
caretakers demonstrated towards a person who was officially declared dead. The 
experience of caring for a deceased person who is warm and pink led to what 
Youngner refers to as the problem of cognitive dissonance which is brought about 
by the overpowering signs of life in a deceased patient: those involved in her care 
were intellectually cognisant of the fact that she was a legally dead person carrying 
a living foetus inside of her, however both mother and foetus radiated such life that 
their caregivers continued to speak of them as though they were alive. 
I was disturbed by its possibilities. The article does not offer substantial 
details pertaining to the process of deliberation that led to the decisions and 
subsequent actions of the medical professional who cared for Janet and her 
unborn child, so I can only speculate. Generally, health care professionals have an 
obligation not to treat the dead. Here we have a dead woman whose body is kept 
alive to serve as an incubator to her unborn child. In light of this, what was Janet's 
4
 Stuart J. Youngner, "Some Must Die" Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science 38, no. 3 (September, 
2003), 717-718. 
7 
ethical and legal status? What was the foetus' standing? Unborn children have 
very limited rights, but in this case the rights of a living foetus obviously supersede 
those of a dead mother. How was risk to the future-child assessed? Were there 
any new technologies used and were they experimental in nature? The article 
does not mention a father, and has Janet's mother making decisions. Giving the 
tragic circumstance of a parent losing a child and the complexity of this situation, 
was she fit to act as a surrogate decision-maker? Whose best interest was she 
protecting, her daughter's, her grandchild's or her own? Was consent truly 
informed? 
Advances in diagnostics and medical technology force us to constantly 
keep up with changing definitions of death as medical professionals are faced with 
the ethical dilemmas of determining who is dead and who is not. Janet's story is 
not unique. Peter Singer offers several examples of similar situations where a 
tragic event leads to a pregnant woman's admission to an intensive care unit, her 
body warm, her heart beating, a respirator supporting her breathing, and brain 
dead.5 He uses these instances to pose the many ethical questions that are raised 
because of medicine's new found ability to keep a brain dead body functioning for 
an extended period of time. 
5
 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of our Traditional Ethics (New York: St. 
Martin's Griffen, 1994), 9-ff. 
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When does one become a person? Who confers personhood? When and 
how is it bestowed? Is it at conception? When a mother becomes aware of the 
pregnancy? At birth? When the law allows? In a very real sense, the answer is all 
of the above. 
When a woman discovers that she is pregnant, she does one of two things. 
She either rejects it and has the pregnancy terminated, never fully acknowledging 
the foetus as a person, or she fully accepts the foetus as a child - a person -
growing within her and she nurtures and cares for it. At this stage, barring any 
natural termination of the pregnancy, whether a person is allowed to exist or not is 
really the mother's choice. In other words, if a child is born depends, to some 
extent, on whether it is wanted. The mother-to-be enters into a relationship with a 
being which has within it the potentiality of full personhood. She may even name it 
in-utero. The mother confers moral personhood on the child, bestowing upon it the 
basic right to life with the duty that ensues from it, and taking upon herself the 
responsibility of seeing that right realized. In short, she enters into a relationship 
with the foetus. 
The acceptance by the parents and, to some extent, by society itself is 
necessary: the foetus is not a child until the decision of the parents intends the 
human person to come and names it as a subject. In this way, the characteristic of 
9 
relationality is important in determining the rights and dignity of nascent human 
life.6 
This relationship between a woman and the human foetus inside of her is 
apparently unreciprocated. She will nurture and care for her future child, and the 
foetus will grow and flourish. Since individuation has yet to occur, the foetus is 
unaware of its mother as a being independent of its self.7 However, the foetus 
carries with it a potentiality, which is inferred from its actuality - its existence, 
forming the foundation of any relationship entered into before birth. 
Generally speaking, initial relationships are defined by blood. The foetus will 
be the son or daughter of those who will be its mother and/or father. Brother and 
sisters, aunts and uncles, cousins and grandparents define their relatedness to the 
developing foetus long before the foetus becomes aware of their existence. In 
defining those relationships, the foetus' identity begins to form - as son, sibling, 
nephew, grandchild, etc. Although contact with the foetus is necessarily less than 
that with its mother, these relationships are no less defined. They are the first 
6
 James J. McCartney, "Some Roman Catholic Concepts of Person and Their Implications for the 
Ontological Status of the Unborn." In Fetus, Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, ed. William B. 
Bondeson et al (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984), 318. 
7
 In this context, individuation is a process of development from a life centred on the ego to a life 
centred on the self. I also discuss this briefly in the section on Human consciousness. 
10 
steps in creating those connections that identify us within and as part of social 
groups. 
The law 
The Criminal Code of Canada states that, 
A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has 
completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or not 
(a) it has breathed; (b) it has an independent circulation; or (c) the navel string is 
severed. 8 
Canadian law does not recognize an unborn child as a legal person 
possessing rights.9 Legal recognition requires that a child be born, at which point 
the child enters into a legal relationship with society, progressively assuming all 
rights, privileges, and responsibilities prescribed by law. It is also at birth, and not 
before, that a new parent/child relationship crystallizes from which flows a legal 
duty on the part of the parents towards the child. 
8
 Part VIII of Canada Criminal Code: Section 223 (1) 
9
 In terms of legal personhood, it is interesting to note that women were not considered persons 
before the law in Canada until 1929. Before that, women were considered persons in matters of 
pains and penalties, but not in matters of rights and privileges. Therefore, women could not vote or 
hold public office. Apparently the unborn do not possess even that minimal level of protection. 
11 
In August of 1996, a drug dependant, pregnant 22 year-old Manitoba 
woman was brought before the courts by the Winnipeg Family and Child Services 
claiming that her addiction to solvent sniffing (glue, nail polish remover, and paint 
thinner) may damage the nervous system of the developing foetus. As a result of 
her addiction, two of her previous children were born permanently disabled and 
are permanent wards of the state. On a motion by the appellant, a Superior Court 
judge ordered that the respondent be placed in the custody of the Director of Child 
and Family Services and detained in a health centre for treatment until the birth of 
her child. One of the grounds for the order was the court's parens patriae 
jurisdiction. The Superior Court judge, while acknowledging that the courts have 
never exercised this power on behalf of an unborn child, saw no reason why the 
power should not be extended to protect unborn children. The order was later 
stayed and ultimately set aside on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the 
existing law of tort and of parens patriae did not support the order and, given the 
difficulty and complexity entailed in extending the law to permit such an order, the 
task was more appropriate for the legislature than the courts. 
Child Services maintained that the twenty-two year old woman should be 
forced into therapy, as her drug dependency was harming her foetus. By the time 
the courts had made the decision to pass this onto the Supreme Court, the baby 
12 
had already been born. By October of that same year, the Supreme Court of 
Canada ruled that "the courts cannot force a pregnant woman to undergo 
treatment to prevent harm to her foetus" thus reaffirming that "a foetus does not 
have legal rights".10 Canadian law dictates that a person has full autonomy over 
her body and her life, a potential person does not. The legal rights of a living 
mother precede those of an unborn child. How are we to understand this? 
Statement of the Question 
In a medically simpler time, separating the living from the dead was a fairly 
straightforward process. If one has a heartbeat and is breathing, then they are 
alive. The absence of breath and a heartbeat would lead to a determination of 
death. It was a common sense determination based on observable evidence. With 
advances in medicine, establishing whether a person is dead or alive is no longer 
a simple matter. Today, medical professionals are faced with the ethical dilemma 
of determining who is dead and who is not by using an ever-changing set of 
attributes or criteria. Medicine's newfound ability to keep the body of a brain-dead 
person functioning for an extended period of time poses many ethical questions. 
As one explores the possibilities of medical science, both actual and potential, one 
10
 "Lawmakers must decide rights of unborn. Top court says." Ottawa Citizen (1 November 1997) A1.; 
1997-10-31 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925, 
1997 CanLII 336 (S.C.C.). 
13 
cannot help but stand in awe of the promise that these new technologies possess. 
However, when a human person encounters modern technology at the most 
liminal moments of one's life, birth and death, tensions are inevitable. 
How ought we to treat someone who is brain-dead, but whose body is still 
warm and breathing? Is a foetus the kind of being whose life we should make 
great efforts to preserve and protect? I believe that the ultimate question one 
should ask is: When does one start or stop being a person? 
Given that persons constitute a basic category of entities to which ethical 
concern or moral consideration is directed, the concept of personhood is 
foundational to ethics. Still, bioethicists need to invoke various notions of 
personhood when deliberating medical issues concerning the beginning and end 
of life. Despite the fact that the body of literature on personhood is considerable, 
consensus on the meaning of the concept of personhood or a practical criterion for 
its application remains elusive. Ruth Macklin offers a reason for this; the values 
underlying the authors' positions determine the outcome. "This is true no matter 
which values underlie the author's position, no matter which definition of 
personhood is adopted, and no matter what the context in which the discussion 
14 
takes place."11 A feminist bias, for example, may cause one to take the stance 
that at no time should a foetus be legally deemed a person, thus affirming a 
woman's full autonomy over her body and her right to choose; while a writer from a 
particular religious tradition might argue for a criterion of personhood that a zygote 
can meet, thereby asserting the sanctity of all life. The complexity of these 
determinations is further exasperated but the fact that they are specific to a given 
context and offer little direction should the context be different. 
The same types of arguments are found at the end of life, as seen in the 
euthanasia debate, where a person asserting their right to choose whether to live 
or die is pitted against those who maintain that all life is sacred. Thus, deliberate 
action with the primary intent of ending a life is unacceptable. These debates 
become even more complex when, in concrete situations, a surrogate is acting on 
behalf of a person unable to speak for themselves. 
Most of the literature on the topic examines the question within a specific 
context and generally produces an outcome that is difficult to apply elsewhere. The 
primary aim of this literature is not to offer a set of determinant or sufficient 
conditions of personhood, but to respond to a specific need in a particular context. 
11
 Ruth Macklin, "Personhood in the Bioethics Literature." The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. 
Health and Society (Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Milbank Memorial Fund) 61, no. 1 (1983), 35-
57. 
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Although helpful, this approach does not really answer the question. What is a 
person? Is it possible to arrive at a concept that is acceptable to all? Is arriving at 
such a concept desirable? 
Such questions have also long preoccupied the imagination of 
philosophers. Enlightenment thinkers maintained the roles of the rational and self-
aware in defining personhood. In Meditations, Descartes states "I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true every time I conceive of it."12 Locke maintained that, "A person is 
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only 
by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, 
essential to it".13 Kant added to Locke's characterization the role of intelligence in 
enabling one to act morally. In his words, "[...] every rational being exists as an 
ends in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will 
... rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them 
out as ends in themselves".14 A more contemporary characterization is offered by 
12
 Rene Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy. Trans. Michael Moriarty. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 2, 7:25. 
13
 John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) XXVII, Para. 9. 
14
 Immanuel Kant. "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals." Ed. Mary Gregor. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 428 
16 
Daniel C. Dennett who adopts earlier notions of intelligence and self-awareness 
and adds the capacity to view others as having intentional mental states, to use 
language and to be "conscious in some special way" not shared by other 
animals.15 
The history of thought on the human person is long and varied, and 
generally proffers two models for exploring personhood at the margins of life: 
physicalism and personalism. Which position one chooses would have important 
consequences when deliberating such contentious issues as abortion and 
euthanasia, given that they view marginal human life - namely embryonic, foetal, 
or that of a patient in a persistent vegetative state - very differently. 
Physicalism, originally formulated by Thomas Aquinas, maintains that 
human beings are structurally constituted to live according to a pattern that is both 
essential and natural. Aquinas was strongly influenced by Aristotle's belief that by 
carefully studying human life we could discover its proper end, its telos. Thus, 
Aquinas held that life's natural purpose was to live, reproduce, and to worship 
God. This notion would form the foundation of his doctrine of Natural Law which, in 
the Christian tradition, would become an absolute norm. In short this doctrine holds 
15
 Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Cambridge, 
Mass: The MIT Press, 1978), 270. 
17 
that God created rational human beings to live in a particular manner, and that the 
knowledge of "natural" life was available to all honest, rational thinkers and that to 
follow natural law is a moral imperative. In considering every facet of the human 
being as partaking of the commonsense pattern as revealed by nature, Traditional 
Roman Catholic moralists pressed Natural Law to its natural conclusion. An 
example of this is the Church's stance on human sexuality and reproduction. The 
natural purpose of the reproductive system is human reproduction; therefore it is 
sinful to deliberately impede this function. This led to a proscription of sexual 
activity for purposes other than procreation, use of contraceptives and humanly 
devised forms of reproduction.16 
Personalism focuses on the concrete human being as a feeling, thinking 
subject who is of highest moral value. Personalism, and its roots, can be 
understood as a post-Enlightenment development which affirms "self-conscious 
experience to be the irreducible synoptic key to reality and defines value as of, by, 
and for persons-in-community. The person is the ontological ultimate, and 
personality is the fundamental explanatory principle".17 In the contemporary 
16
 James W. Walters. What is a Person?: An Ethical Exploration. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1997. 18 -f f . 
17
 Walter Muelder, "Personalism," in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. James F. 
Childress and John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 469, as quoted by James 
Walter in, What is a Person?: An Ethical Exploration. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 
20. 
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context, personalism is characterized by several traits: a belief in reason, an 
appreciation for interdisciplinary studies, a commitment to theism, a non-dogmatic 
view of moral truth, a belief in freedom and a passion for the experience of the 
individual person. Although radical in their day, these notions have prevailed in the 
modern consciousness forming part of the contemporary Western intellectual 
worldview, influencing more contemporary schools of thought such as 
existentialism, phenomenology, and anti-foundationalism. 
Personalism in North America is best understood in light of the English who 
settled in the New World and their hunger for a new perspective on the human 
individual. Puritans, the first English settlers to the New World, found themselves in 
increasing disagreement with the High Anglican Church. The early Puritans, 
confident in the belief that they were the elect of God, found sustenance in the 
doctrine of election during their difficult struggles. As the new settlements became 
more self-sufficient, the Puritan emphasis on divine power and control held little 
sway over colonists who had grown to cherish the freedoms of frontier life. 
Preaching of repentance, divine sovereignty and human inability was met with 
apathy. The Dutch, who would later also settle in the New World, brought with 
them a new theology which emphasized a focus human free will as opposed to 
divine sovereignty; and that a belief in Jesus Christ's death was universally 
19 
efficacious as opposed to divine predestination of only the elect. This more 
democratic theology would later have a significant influence on Methodism and its 
strong emphasis on human responsibility.18 
Although philosophically divergent, physicalism and personalism both have 
theological foundations. Physicalist thinkers would be critical of a more personalist 
view that would define persons in terms of their unique capacities as opposed to 
their biological and rational natures. What is valued is not simply humans 
displaying rationality, but the substance which possesses this nature. The 
parameters marking rational beings are identical to those of humanity itself. 
Personalism, on the other hand, values the human person, freedom, rationality 
and responsibility. Fundamental to some thinkers is the distinction between 
potential persons and actual persons since only actual persons can speak, reason 
and judge between right and wrong. Therefore, a human foetus or someone in 
advanced dementia are not fully persons.19 
James W. Walters, What is a Person?: An Ethical Exploration. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1997), 19-23. 
19
 Hartshome Charles, "Concerning Abortion: An Attempt at a Rational View." In The Christian 
Century 98 (21 Jan. 1981): 42-45, as cited in James W. Walters, What is a Person?: An Ethical 





In the following discussion, I examine the prevailing contemporary concepts 
advanced to define personhood in traditional ethics. What I intend is an 
examination of what it is to be a person as it applies to the field of clinical ethics 
and that necessarily requires a framework within which a dialogue can occur. As 
such, I will also be limiting myself to human persons. I will draw this framework 
from the writings of Bernard Lonergan. 
In a short Christological reflection entitled Christology Today: 
Methodological Reflections 20, Bernard Lonergan contemplates the person of 
Christ and what it means to live a fully human life, while considering whether one 
can be a man without being fully human. In addressing this, he proposes three 
aspects or characteristics of the human person: identity, human consciousness 
and human subjectivity. Lonergan's depiction of what is, in Christian terms, the 
paradigmatic human person - Jesus of Nazareth - can suitably be used in 
formulating a context for this study. 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan,"Christology Today: Methodological Reflection." In A Third Collection: 
Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan. Edited by Frederick E Crowe. (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 
1985), 90-95. 
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Within this framework, I will juxtapose Lonergan's characteristics with 
Daniel Dennett's six conditions of personhood which are representative of many 
contemporary notions: persons are rational, conscious, intentional, reciprocal, 




"As humans, we're both part of nature and part beyond nature - in 
our human spirit, our longing for transcendence and 
transformation. "21 
In our daily lives we have little difficulty in identifying those things which we 
would designate as persons. Generally, we would allow humans to this category 
while excluding all other things. We often hear the term 'person' being used as 
though it were synonymous with 'human' yet we know this not to be true. Few 
would argue that a zygote or a corpse are not human. A good case may even be 
made for the dignity of both in terms of the potentiality and relationality, the person 
they were, the person they could be, the lives they have touched, or will touch. 
However, it would be difficult to argue for their personhood, possessing all the 
rights and responsibilities allowed by God, nature and the law. We also recognise 
conditions that would exempt some human beings from some very important 
elements of personhood, i.e., humans with mental defects or who have been 
Margaret Somerville, The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the Human Spirit (Toronto, ON: House of 
Anansi Press, 2006), 157. 
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declared insane.22 Furthermore, the characteristics of relationality and self-
consciousness are also important in determining rights and dignity of emerging 
human life. As I alluded to earlier, there is a need for an acceptance by the parents 
and to some extent by society itself. "The foetus is not a child until the decision of 
the parents anticipates the human form to come and names it as a subject."23 
In the contemporary context, human personhood, its beginnings and 
endings is essentially a legal construct. However, the lived human experience of 
these events is rarely that simple. A child is not deemed a legal person until it is 
born, yet the community into which it will be born would treat it as though it were 
long before the child draws a first breath. Moreover, the story of Janet recounted 
at the beginning of the preceding chapter, expresses in a radical way the human 
response of those charged with the care of a person declared dead who is warm 
and pink, and the living foetus within her. The cognitive dissonance experienced by 
the caregivers demonstrates the sort of tensions that arise when one discusses 
the concept of personhood. Janet was officially declared dead, therefore human 
but no longer a person in the legal sense and the foetus that she was carrying -
Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 1978), 267. 
James J. McCartney, "Some Roman Catholic Concepts of Person and Their Implications for the 
Ontological Status of the Unborn." In Fetus, Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, ed. William B. 
Bondeson et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984), 318. 
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human but not yet a person. However, Janet's caregivers treated her and her 
unborn child with the respect and dignity consistent with recognizing their intrinsic 
worth as human persons. 
The prevailing concepts advanced to define personhood fall into two 
opposing schools of thought: the physicalist or the personalist model of human life. 
The physicalist model holds that the embodied human being, because of their live 
physical presence, shares in the nature of human-ness and hence possesses the 
full moral standing of personhood. The personalist model maintains that certain 
rational and emotional capacities are necessary for an individual to be deemed a 
person deserving of full moral standing. The model one chooses can have 
important implications for decisions about such issues as abortion and 
euthanasia.24 
The American philosopher, Daniel Dennett's conception of personhood is, 
in my opinion, representative of the more contemporary notions of personhood. He 
is a noted atheist and secularist, so I thought that it would be an interesting 
exercise to juxtapose his work with that of Bernard Lonergan. In an article entitled 
"Conditions of Personhood", he proffers six conditions for personhood, asserting 
James W. Walters, What is a Person?: An Ethical Exploration. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1997), 9-10. 
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that persons are beings that are: rational; to which states of consciousness are 
attributed or to which intentional predicates are ascribed; have an attitude taken 
towards or a stance adopted with respect to it; are capable of reciprocating; are 
capable of verbal communication; and finally, are discernible from other beings by 
being conscious in some special way.25 
In a short paper entitled Christology Today: Methodological Reflections, 26 
Bernard Lonergan considers what it means for a divine person to live a fully 
human life while pondering the question - Can one be a man without being a 
human person? He speaks of the person of Christ as an identity that is eternally is 
the subject of divine consciousness and in time became the subject of a human 
consciousness. Under the heading 'Person Today', Lonergan devotes the last five 
pages of his essay to this very question, which he addresses by proposing five 
aspects or characteristics of the divine/human person: identity, human 
consciousness, human subjectivity, divine subjectivity and the compatibility of one 
identity with two subjectivities. Lonergan's characterization of what is, in Christian 
terms, the paradigmatic human person in the person of Jesus of Nazareth can 
'Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1981), 267-286. 
' Bernard J.F. Lonergan,"Christology Today: Methodological Reflection." In A Third Collection: 
Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan. Edited by Frederick E Crowe. (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 
1985), 90-95. 
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properly be utilized in creating a useful framework for this study. These 
characteristics can be treated in two parts: the human encompassing identity, 
human consciousness, human subjectivity; and the divine comprising divine 
subjectivity and the compatibility of one identity with two subjectivities. Since the 
context of this discussion focuses on the human person, questions of divine 
subjectivity are beyond the purview of my study. 
I understand that there are some inherent difficulties in using the term 
'necessary conditions of personhood' since it infers an absolute criterion that must 
be met, but that is not my intention here. What I intend is an examination of what it 
is to be a person as it applies to the field of clinical ethics and that necessarily 
requires a framework within which a dialogue can occur. As such, I will also be 




For Lonergan, person as a reality emerges from the potential of being 
human: being a person is primarily a question of human identity, human 
consciousness and human subjectivity. Although an obvious delineation of these 
three elements may not be possible, they are distinct components of the same 
reality. They are interconnected and a clearer understanding can be had insofar as 
each element builds upon and elucidates the other two. 
Man is an instance of human species; he is one as intelligible 
unity in an ongoing process; finally, he is one in the same, as 
identity, as one and nobody else.27 
Human Identity 
Identity is a sense of oneness: one in the sense of an instance; one in the 
sense of intelligible unity; and one in the sense of one in the same; which 
Lonergan explicates by using the features of human knowing. 
There is an evolution of our consciousness which moves from experiencing 
to understanding to judging to deciding. One experiences the oneness of a datum, 
of an instance of something, but what that thing is yet to be understood. 
—."Christology Today: Methodological Reflection." In A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. 
Lonergan. Edited by Frederick E Crowe. (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1985), 92. 
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Understanding in turn leads to the oneness of an intelligible unity. Next, critical 
reflection seizes the correlation of that understanding with datum of experience, 
issuing a judgement which validates the intelligible unity as real, as in fact itself 
and nothing else. Identity, then, is the concrete existence of an actual individual, 
distinct from all others.28 
An instance of human species 
To affirm, as Lonergan does, that humans are instances of the same 
species is to make an empirical statement: a human being is a biologically-defined 
entity, an organism, possessing a body with specific traits and properties. As 
biological individuals, we share with all beings in the natural world, be they plant or 
animal, our most basic needs. 
It is interesting to note that Dennett does not treat humanity as a 
determining element of personhood. Admitting that we recognise most human 
beings as persons, it is not inconceivable, for Dennett and others, to contemplate 
the existence of biological entities inhabiting other planets that are not human but 
persons nonetheless. By extension, we may even envisage, as some do, 
extending elements of personhood to earthly non-human creatures. He also 
William P. Loewe, "Jesus, the Son of God." In The Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to 
the Theology of Bernard Lonergan, Edited by Vernon Gregson. (Ottawa, ON: The Lonergan 
Website, 2004), 188-189. 
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reminds us that, as a matter of course, certain humans - human infants, mentally 
defective humans or those declared insane, for example - are exempt from some 
important elements of personhood.29 Simply put, all persons are not necessarily 
human and all humans are not fully persons. In terms of the former, I reiterate that 
my interest here focuses solely on human persons. As for the latter, responsibility 
and the ability to discern and act ethically is an important element in Dennett's 
thinking. To hold a person responsible for an action, that person must be capable 
of forming the intent to act. However, I would argue that exempting certain 
humans from important elements of personhood because of incapacity - be it 
developmental as in the case of an infant or mental defect - is done so to protect 
the very personhood we are discussing and ought not to diminish it. 
Humans are the types of beings that are capable of perceiving and acting in 
the world around them. We possess a stream of creature consciousness, a quality 
we share with other sentient beings, which flows in a 'biological pattern' enabling 
us to attain biological ends. As sentient beings, we experience the material world, 
its sights, sounds, and smells. At this level, our consciousness is of 'already out 
there now real'. In this context, 'already' refers to the consciousness that does not 
create, but finds its environment fully constituted. 'Out' characterizes this 
Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 267. 
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consciousness as oriented outwards - extroverted - to potential opportunities for 
satisfying needs. Although the object of this consciousness is distinct from itself, it 
is not a consciousness of the self. There' and 'now' point to the spatial and 
temporal determinations. 
This consciousness is oriented towards biological ends, as well as 
anticipating means to those ends. Its reality converges in its significance to 
biological success or failure, pleasure or pain. It is a grasping intelligence; a 
biological, non-intelligent response to stimuli lacking in intelligent procedure: an 
elementary, non-conceptual type of knowing established totally on the level of 
sensory experience of the perceptible world. 30 It is through our bodies that we 
experience the world. It is also through our bodies that we are individualized. 
The body provides us with one element of identity: it allows us to relate to 
each other and the world around us. Much of who we are is inscribed on our 
bodies. At the most primal level, species, race and sex are imbued in the womb. It 
is at this point that we begin to distinguish the human from the non-human animal. 
Our bodies are circumcised and baptised, dressed and decorated, pierced and 
tattooed, allowing us to affirm, declare, integrate and differentiate the self and the 
Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. 5th. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe & Robert 
M. Doran. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 276-277. 
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other. They tell our story, our narrative. Not only do our bodies speak of where we 
come from in terms of the natural world, but also of who we are, who we see 
ourselves to be, and as whom we present ourselves to the world. 
Furthermore, there can only be one person for each body. Aristotle argued 
that although the soul might have different parts and different functions that these 
parts perform, there is only one body that can be moved.31 Therefore, given that 
there is only one body that can be set in motion, there is one agent that can act. In 
order for one to be a person at any given time, one must be an embodied 'instance 
of human species'. 
Intelligible unity 
Lonergan's second element is "one as intelligible unity in an ongoing 
process." There are two parts to this component: one as intelligible unity, and the 
other as an ongoing process. 
Substantially, all organisms, be they plant, animal or human, possess an 
individual existing unity - one in the same intelligible unity which can be grasped 
intelligently and affirmed reasonably. Lonergan uses the example of the moon's 
many phases to illustrate this point. The moon's appearance changes nightly as it 
Aristotle, deAnima Book III Ch. 9-10. 
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goes through its phases, although there is but one moon. The human substance is 
unchanging. A human being is a human being at any age, whether awake or 
asleep, "sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a moron, a saint or a sinner". 
These differences are accidental to the substance. "But they are not accidental to 
the subject, for the subject is not an abstraction; he is a concrete reality, all of him, 
a being in the luminousness of being."32 A person is a being in process and, 
accordingly, its existence lies in development. Lonergan speaks of an ongoing 
process: "the same individual, existing unity developing organically, psychically 
and intellectually".33 This development is a dynamic structure that advances over 
time. In Lockean terms, "[...] a participation of the same continued life, by 
constantly fleeting particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same 
organized Body". M 
John Locke, in 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding', also 
discusses the concept of sameness over time stating that, in living organisms, a 
Bernard Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento." In Introducing the Thought of Bernard 
Lonergan:Three Papers from 'Collection" with an Introduction by Philip McShane. (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd Ltd, 1973), 35. 
—. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. 5th. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 484. 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
207. 
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later being is identical to an earlier one if and only if it "partakes in the same life". 
Hence, my dog Monty today is identical to the dog he was a decade ago if and 
only if this later Monty is physically continuous with the earlier Monty and has 
remained the same dog throughout having the same functional organization and 
internal processes. The same applies to all living organisms. Therefore, a human 
being is identical to an earlier one if and only if the latter is physically continuous 
with the former, and has remained human throughout. The same physical object 
may satisfy different conditions of identity over time - an organism may still be 
made of the same material but cease to be the same organism if it dies, for 
example. Although it is still made of the same material, it is no longer the same 
organism since its functional organizational and internal processes are no longer 
vitally connected. 
one in the same, as identity, as one and nobody else 
This third element presupposes the intelligible unity discussed above but 
adds the notion of identity. A being is a person at any given moment if that being 
is conscious of itself as itself. And what makes a later person identical to an earlier 
person is that they are subjects in time - having the same consciousness or the 
same self-conscious memories of the earlier person. Consciousness and 
—. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 206. 
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intentional acts continuously shift making the present moment move out of the past 
and into the future. The person, as an intending subject, is linked to the past 
through memory and to the future through anticipation. We are, therefore, 
products of our pasts which form the foundation of the person we will become. 36 
There is an important distinction that Lonergan makes. By differentiating 
human identity from personal identity, Lonergan distinguishes human species from 
human consciousness - substance and subject.37 The former has to do with 
bodies and substances partaking in the same life and persisting over time, while 
the latter has to do with consciousness and awareness of one's self over time. 
Both are essential to personal identity in the moral sense, given that persons are 
things about which we make moral judgements. Human beings that can be held 
responsible for their actions must necessarily be the types of beings that are able 
to perform actions. They must have some motor abilities. They must also possess 
the ability to perceive, and it is in virtue of these perceptions and produced actions 
that they are persons. Therefore, being that substance and subject are essential 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Method in Theology. (Toronto: Univiersity of Toronto Press, 1971), 181. 
—. "Existenz and Aggiornamento." In Introducing the Thought of Bernard Lonergan:Three Papers 
from 'Collection" with an Introduction by Philip McShane. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd, 
1973), 35-36. 
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elements, in order for one to be a person at any given time, they must be 
embodied a person - a unified person. 
Human Consciousness 
A person's sensitive, intellectual, rational and moral operations have two 
separate but related characteristics; intentionality and consciousness. They are 
intentional in that they make objects present to the subject - 'of a spectacle to the 
spectator'. Consciousness, on the other hand, makes the subject present to itself 
not as object but as spectator and subject, the distinction between object and 
subject is not innate in infants. In the adult consciousness, subject and object are 
distinct. However, in the nascent consciousness of the newborn the process of 
individuation is one of development from a life centred on the ego to a life centred 
on the self - from a consciousness of an 'already out there now real' to one of the 
self as distinct from that out there reality.38 
38
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Daniel Dennett also considers intentionality and consciousness as elements 
of personhood.39 As a criterion of personhood, he maintains that a person must be 
an intentional system, which he defines as: 
"[...] a system whose behaviour can be (at least sometimes) 
explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of 
beliefs and desires (and other intentionally characterized features -
what I will call intentions here, meaning to include hopes, fears, 
intentions, perceptions, expectations, etc."40 
For something to be considered an intentional system, it must meet three 
conditions. The subject must be rational, must be a being to which intentional 
predicates are attributed, and they must be ones towards which you can adopt the 
intentional stance. These themes are mutually interdependent; being rational is 
being intentional is being the object of a certain stance. 
The first and most obvious theme is that for a being to be an intentional 
system, that being must be rational. Simply stated, rational beings are the types of 
beings that are able to learn from past experience, and are able to perform 
For a more complete discussion, see: Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on 
Mind and Psychology. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1981), 3-22; 267-286. 
Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 1981), 271. 
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complex tasks using this acquired knowledge. Kant and Rawls also maintain that 
humans are persons by virtue of their rationality. 
Kant allows rationality in his characterization of the person for its role in 
enabling one to act morally. In his words, "[...] every rational being exists as an 
end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will 
[...] rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks 
them out as ends in themselves."41 He grounds both personhood and his ethical 
theory in the rationality of humans. By being rational agents, we recognize the fact 
that we must act in accordance with the categorical imperative. John Rawls 
grounds personhood in rationality as well, and believes that it is this rationality that 
leads a person to recognize the principles of justice.42 
Next, the being must have intentional or psychological predicates ascribed 
to them - they are beings to whom you can attribute consciousness. This condition 
is linked to the next, since to make such attributions requires one to take an 
intentional stance. 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4:428. 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
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Finally, in order to be considered an intentional system, one must be the 
type of being towards which we can adopt the intentional stance. One can explain 
this system's behaviour by appealing to this system's intentional states: acts, 
beliefs, goals, desires, thoughts and knowledge. If adopting the intentional stance 
towards a system proves to be useful in predicting its behaviour, then it is an 
intentional system. 
"One predicts behaviour in such a case by ascribing to the system the 
possession of certain information and by supposing it to be directed by certain 
goals, and then by working out the most reasonable or appropriate action on the 
basis of these ascriptions and suppositions. '43 
Dennett distinguishes between intentional systems by offering the notion of 
a second-order intentional system which he defines as, "one to which we ascribe 
not only simple beliefs, desires, and other intentions, but beliefs, desires and other 
intentions about beliefs, desires and other intentions".44 An example of this would 
be that Jack - a second-order intentional system - believes that Jill desires to go 
up the hill and fetch a pail of water. Or in the reflexive as in the case of Jill - a 
Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 1978), 6. 
—. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 
1978), 273. 
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second-order intentional system - who believes that she, herself, desires to go up 
the hill and fetch a pail of water. The latter infers self-consciousness, which we will 
discuss later. 
At this point I would like to state that one need not necessarily agree with 
Dennett's 'attributivism' about intentional states to find merit in his ideas, nor am I 
saying that we do not have intentional states. Rather, that both this ability to make 
such attributions and the fact that these attributions, predispositions or habits, and 
the actions that flow from them can reasonably be applied to persons making us 
the kind of beings that hold ourselves and others responsible for actions. In this 
context, having intentional states is a necessary condition for being a person. 
However, Dennett's stance does not require that the intentional systems 
actually have these intentional states. It simply holds that it would be reasonable to 
attribute certain states - that is beliefs, goals, and desires - to them when 
predicting behaviour and making moral judgments. I would also question the value 
of intentional states in predicting behaviour. "Whatever else a person might be -
embodied mind or soul, self-conscious moral agent, 'emergent' form of intelligence 
- he is an intentional system, and whatever follows just from being an intentional 
41 
system thus is true of a person."45 However, I will concede that human beings do 
have intentional states. It is the acknowledgement of these intentional states that 
allow us to hold ourselves and others responsible as autonomous beings. 
Lonergan writes: 
"[...] it appears that deeds, discoveries, affect the subject more deeply than 
they affect the object with which they are concerned. They accumulate as 
dispositions and habits of the subject; they determine him; they make him what he 
is and what he is to be."46 Arguably, dispositions and habits, or intentional states 
can have a predictive or determinant element to them; however the human subject 
is a being becoming - a 'free and responsible self-constituting subject' that acts 
within his world, his socio-cultural context; and as the subject develops and grows 
through experience and understanding, so does his world. This is a dynamic 
process that, in my opinion, challenges Dennett's brand of predictability. 
For beings to be persons, they must be capable of reciprocating in some 
way: to be a person is to treat others as persons. This is related to the previous 
—. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT 
Press, 1978), 16. 
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point since for persons to be able to make such attributions, they need to have 
intentional states and must be able to attribute intentional states to others. In other 
words, one is not a person unless he recognizes others as persons as well. 
Persons are relational creatures. They enter into interpersonal relationships and 
develop in interaction with the humanly constructed world which they inhabit. 
Dennett's next condition relates to the previous: the ability to communicate 
verbally. This condition excludes all non-human animals from full personhood and 
the attendant moral responsibility. According to Dennett, in order for one to be a 
moral agent one must be able to communicate, and this is implicit in all social 
contract theories. Again, this relates to the ability to assume or attribute an 
intentional stance. To attribute a notion, for example, to someone else, one must 
be able to represent this notion and to recognize it in another. Language is, at its 
very essence, a vehicle of communication - a conveyance of meaning. This 
requires a sophisticated conceptual framework which presupposes linguistic 
abilities. However, verbal communication is but one way of transmitting meaning. 
Symbols, be they in art or in the lives and actions of persons, are also means of 
expression. 
The preceding two conditions, the ability to reciprocate and communicate, 
advert to Lonergan's notion of intersubjectivity - the immediacy of being with others 
and more specifically, to the intersubjective communication of meaning which is 
the embodiment of human intersubjectivity. I will return to this point in the section 
on human intersubjectivity in the next chapter. 
43 
This brings us to Dennett's final condition: persons are conscious in some 
special way, they have self-awareness. Consciousness is implied throughout his 
conditions, if one were to treat them holistically rather than individually. The first 
three are interdependent: being rational is being intentional is being the object of a 
certain stance. These three together, which form an intentional system, are an 
essential but inadequate condition for exhibiting the form of reciprocity that is in 
turn an essential but inadequate condition for having the capacity for verbal 
communication, which is the essential condition for having a special sort of self-
consciousness which is a necessary condition of personhood.47 In other words, 
they are emergent - each theme buttresses the next and completes the whole. It 
is the capacity for reflexive attribution or awareness which distinguishes persons 
from other living creatures. If a being can make itself the object of its own thinking, 
then that being is a person. 
Lonergan's cognitive operations provide valuable insight into his notion of 
consciousness. To be conscious is to be conscious of something -to intend an 
object. By seeing, there becomes present that which is seen, by hearing that which 
is heard, by imaging that which is imagined. There is also a distinction drawn 
Daniel C.Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 1978), 271. 
44 
between act and content, between seeing and colour, hearing and sound, and so 
on. 
Furthermore, consciousness is a cognitional process which affirms not only 
a procession of content, but also a procession of acts which grows out of the 
experience of the subject being aware that it is conscious of an object. It is the 
experience of the relationship between ourselves as conscious and the object of 
which we are conscious. In terms of the operations, "the subject is aware of 
himself operating, present to himself operating, experiencing himself operating".48 
Lonergan emphasized the distinction between the self-presence of the 
subject as subject and the intentional presence of subject as object, marking them 
as distinct yet inseparable aspects of consciousness. Self-presence differs from 
reflective or objective self-knowledge in that it is a matter of experience and not of 
understanding and/or judgement: self-presence precedes self-knowledge. The 
subject is present to itself in the act of gazing, hearing, imagining and 
understanding. The subject as object, however, is present in being gazed upon, 
Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology. (Toronto: Univiersity of Toronto Press, 1971), 9. 
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heard, imagined or understood. In short, the subject is conscious of itself doing, 
it is self-conscious. 
Human consciousness is also 'polymorphic', flowing in patterns which may 
be biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual or mystical. These 
patterns oscillate and are often in tension with each other; they converge and 
conflict, they can obstruct and assist; lose their way, break down and succeed. 50 
Human Subjectivity 
"Substance prescinds from the difference between the opaque 
being that is merely substance and the luminous being that is 
conscious. Subject is the luminous being. 's1 
Lonergan distinguishes the human subject from human subjectivity. The 
term "subject" denotes the identity we discussed earlier, that is a person is: one as 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan/'Christology Today: Methodological Reflection." In A Third Collection: 
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an instance of the human species; one as an intelligible unity in an ongoing 
process; and one as one in the same, as oneself and nobody else. To paraphrase 
Lonergan, the subject is the emergent, luminous being that is conscious. Each is a 
distinct being which mediates its world by meaning in a process of self-realization 
through self-transcendence. Furthermore, a world mediated by meaning is not 
simply reality, but reality as known where the knowing is in continuous process. 
Given that a person's self-realization is by self-transcendence and without 
difference there is no self-transcendence, then without identity it is not one's self 
that is realized but that of another.53 
Human subjectivity, on the other hand, is the intelligible unity in the multi-
manifold of the conscious events of a lifetime. It denotes "the intelligible that 
already is teleologically what it eventually is to become".54 Authentic human 
subjectivity refers to a subject's attentiveness to oneself experiencing one's world; 
endeavouring to understand it; reflecting on that understanding; deliberating in 
Dennett does not explicitly discuss the notion of human subjectivity, although it is implied when he 
considers self-awareness and reflexive attribution. Therefore, for this section, I will rely solely on 
Lonergan. 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan,"Christology Today: Methodological Reflection." In A Third Collection: 
Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan. Edited by Frederick E Crowe. (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 
1985), 92. 
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search of, and judging, the truth; and acting responsibly in accordance with the 
truth that is affirmed. 
Notice that the world of one's experience is not 'the world', but rather 'one's 
world'. The world is that which is there to be known, but is unaffected by its being 
known. The subject's world, however, is correlative to the subject: it is the ever 
expanding, always deepening world of experience - the world that the human 
person actually lives in and develops. 
As the being of the subject is becoming, so is his world. From the world of 
immediacy, an infantile world of immediate experience which is unencumbered by 
insight, reflection or deliberation; to one mediated by meaning, known when the 
experiencing is amplified by understanding and judging; to finally a world 
constituted by meaning, the world of language, art and action. 55 The world of 
human intersubjectivity. 
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"As man's being is being-in-the-world, his self-understanding is 
not only of himself but also of his world."56 
Human persons do not exist as individuals in isolation, or even as 
collectives of individuals, but are formed within socio-cultural contexts. The themes 
that Dennett presents as constituting a person: an intentional system which is 
rationality, intentional, intended, reciprocating, verbal and self-conscious; and 
those which Lonergan proffers: human identity, human consciousness and human 
subjectivity, have one important notion in common. The concept of 
intersubjectivity - the immediacy of being with others. It is at the heart of human 
existence and serves to connect persons to each other and to their worlds. 
Intersubjectivity or inter-relatedness takes on several forms: pre-intentional to 
intentional, emotional to cognitive. 57 
We possess the capacity of intentional communication of meaning through 
language, symbols, art and action. Intersubjectivity also exists prior to this 
—."Christology Today: Methodological Reflection." In A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. 
Lonergan. Edited by Frederick E Crowe. (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1985), 23. 
—. Method in Theology. (Toronto: Univiersity of Toronto Press, 1971), 57-59. 
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capacity. There is a form of reciprocal human interaction that precedes self-
consciousness: an intersubjectivity that is vital, atavistic or spontaneous, rather 
than deliberate or intentional. It is a 'we' that precedes the ' I ' of the differentiated 
subject. A common consciousness of human beings as beings, it is the 
undifferentiated collective, pre-intentional consciousness which becomes apparent 
in spontaneous acts. Just as one reaches out when falling in the hope of breaking 
the fall, so does one reach out to save someone else from falling. The help given 
another is not a deliberate act, but rather a reflexive, intuitive, spontaneous act 
which is immediate and unpremeditated. "It is as if 'we' were members of one 
another prior to our distinctions of each from the others."58 
Another intersubjectivity that Lonergan points to is that of feelings and their 
communication. It is divided into four categories: community of feeling, fellow-
feeling, psychic contagion, and emotional identification. The former two are 
intentional responses that advert to the object that arouse the feelings. Community 
of feeling points to two or more persons reacting in the like fashion to the same 
object, whereas with fellow-feeling a second person responds to the first person's 
reaction to the object. For example, community of feeling is observed in a family 
—. Method in Theology. (Toronto: Univiersity of Toronto Press, 1971), 57. 
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grieving the passing of a loved one, while fellow-feeling would be the reaction to 
the grief felt by an outsider. 
Psychic contagion and emotional identification, on the other hand, are 
spontaneous, vital responses. The former denotes a sharing of another's emotions 
without associating it directly to the object, as in the way that laughter is 
contagious even if one hasn't heard the joke or when one shares in the sadness of 
another without knowing the cause of their sorrow. The latter is apparent in the 
emotional identity of a mother and an infant where differentiation is either 
underdeveloped, as is the case of the infant, or retreated from, as it is with the 
mother. Here we experience a retreat from personal differentiation and a 
suspension of individuality, to vital unity and a single stream of instinct and 
feeling.59 
Spontaneous intersubjectivity in all its forms is experienced in the bodily 
presence of another where we encounter the incarnate spirit of the other. That 
incarnate spirit is revealed and communicated in every motion of the eyes or the 
lips, the voice and its tone, arm movements, stance and facial expressions. "Such 
revelation is not an object to be apprehended. Rather it works immediately upon 
my subjectivity, to make me share the other's seriousness or vivacity, ease or 
—. Method in Theology. (Toronto: Univiersity of Toronto Press, 1971), 57-59. 
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embarrassment, joy or sorrow, and similarly my response affects his subjectivity, 
leads him on to say more, or quietly or imperceptibly rebuffs him, holds him off, 
closes the door."60 
Although Dennett does not overtly consider intersubjectivity as one of his 
conditions, he does make strong allusions to it when he attributes themes such as 
being an intentional system, reciprocal and communicative, to the person. The 
capacity to: intend another, to attribute intentional states, goals and desires to 
another; to be intended in the same fashion; to reciprocate or to enter into 
interpersonal relationships with another; or to communicate or to convey meaning 
to another; necessarily requires that one engage another - intersubjectivity. In 
order to engage the other one must transcend the self. The implication here is that 
Dennett would have to at least consider Lonergan's notion that the person is a 
being that is self-transcendent. Furthermore, the attribution of particular intentional 
states to, communication with and reciprocity for a particular individual at a 
particular moment, speaks to Lonergan's ideas around identity as being sense of 
oneness in time and space. This reciprocal or mutual identification of the other 
would support Lonergan's assertion that identity is the concrete existence of an 
—. "Dimensions of Meaning." In The Lonergan Reader. Edited by ManVD. Morelli & Elizabeth A. 
Morelli. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 398. 
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actual individual, distinct from all others. Identity is contingent on the other, or in 
other words, without the other, there is no identity. 
A person's self realization is achieved in self-transcendence: at the 
summit of authentic human experience is an intersubjectivity, an interrelation, a 
dialogue, a communion of spirit with others - with the ultimate Other. In 
community, we find ourselves not simply as members of a family, church, 
community or nation of our world, but also of a world, which at once incorporates 
and transcends race, religion and nation. 
In the previous chapter, I referred to Jesus of Nazareth as the paradigmatic 
person. Jesus was human. A first-century Jew, he was born into a tradition, a 
race and a nation. He inherited a language and a religion. He was raised in a 
family and worked as a craftsman. Jesus attended synagogue and went to the 
Temple, where he prayed and participated in religious services. He joined in 
wedding celebrations and paid taxes. He mixed with rich and poor, clean and 
unclean, merchant, trader and fisherman. He sweated, hungered and thirsted. He 
experienced suffering and joy, friendship and animosity, loss and victory. 
Jesus of Nazareth was there as a human person, that was the land and the 
people he knew. That was his world, his place and time. It is where he shared his 
friendship, his healing presence, and preached his message of the Father's 
Kingdom to come. Through the example of his earthly life, Jesus invited those he 




The doctrine of the Trinity provides a theological foundation for the 
appreciation of an essential insight into the human person as a reflection of God. 
"To say that the human person is the image of God is first a theological statement 
before it is an anthropological one."61 In Genesis, the creation story tells us that 
we are created in the image of God, thus affirming the sacredness or dignity of the 
person. As a theological statement, this reveals something about our relationship 
with God, and what it means to be human. It tells us that since the human person 
will always remain God's image and enjoy a sacred dignity, we cannot be fully 
understood apart from God. This relationship, prior to any other, is nourished by 
the Divine's faithfulness and love. As an anthropological statement, Imago Dei 
declares that we all partake in a common human condition which has a common 
telos - God. Human dignity is independent of any human achievement or 
capacity, but is sustained by and flows freely from Divine love. 
The doctrine of the Trinity is an intricate elucidation of the most fundamental 
Christian metaphor for God as represented in the Gospels and in Paul's epistles.62 
Richard M.Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. (New York: Paulist 
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God is agape, the pure self gift that is the "mystery which grounds and surrounds 
all existence". This idea forms the foundation of the synoptic gospels' linking the 
commandments to love God and to love the neighbour as being equal. In fact, we 
are charged to: "Love one another; just as I have loved you, you also must love 
one another" (Jn. 3:34). 
The nature of divine agape is necessarily free and unconditioned. As pure 
self gift, God must eternally be the giver, receiver and gift. "'God' is the name of 
the relationship of an endless perfect mutual self gift: in our traditional imagery, the 
Father gives himself totally to the Son, the Son gives himself totally to the Father, 
and the Spirit, proceeding from both, is the bond of that pure agapic love."63 God 
is the fullest expression of relatedness. The imperatives to be perfect as God is 
perfect, and to love one another as God loves us, indicate that being and loving 
are one and the same. To be, is to be in a matrix of relationships whose elements 
are spatially and temporally co-terminous with the universe. Being is to be 
somewhere at sometime. As Lonergan would put it, being is being in the world. To 
deny this relatedness is to flirt with non-being. 
Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 63-
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The doctrine of the Trinity makes an important contribution to the notion of 
personhood. In speaking of the Trinity, Augustine used the Latin persona which 
he characterized as a person existing not as directed to self, but rather as directed 
to other. Aquinas taught that the term 'person' applies pre-eminently to God 
because relation is the divine essence. Implied in this is that no one exists alone, 
but rather in relationship with others. Being is relatedness: the individual and the 
community co-exist. "Humanity and relatedness are proportional so that the 
deeper one's participation is, the more human one becomes."64 
As we have already discussed, Lonergan's notion of what constitutes the 
human person is an individual possessing: a human identity, which he 
characterizes as a unique instance of human species that is an intelligible unity in 
an ongoing process; human consciousness, and human subjectivity. A portrayal 
of Louis Janssens' notion is: 
"... that the human person is adequately considered when taken as an historical 
subject in corporeality who stands in relation to the world, to other person, to social 
Richard M.Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1989), 65. 
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structures, and to God, and who is a unique originality within the context of being 
fundamentally equal with other persons." 65 
Furthermore, the person is concurrently and continuously - "always and at the 
same time" - each and every one of these dimensions acting together to form the 
unity which is the integral human person. Therefore, collectively these dimensions 
compose an integral, unified, and adequately considered person, and share in the 
creation of the human person as the image of God. 
Jansenns largely agrees with Lonergan. As with Lonergan's components of 
personhood, Jansenns' are distinct and interconnected dimensions of the same 
reality. They are non-hierarchical: each component builds upon, and is elucidated 
by, the others. Jansenns' person is a unique, embodied and historical subject who 
exists in relationship with the other, the world, and with God. 
Relationality, be it personal, spatial or temporal is at the very essence of the 
human person. In theological terms, this intrinsic value flows from the notion of 
Trinity and maintains that human beings are created in God's image; and since the 
very essence of God is relationship, then relationality is the very essence of the 
person. Human existence is not prior to relationship, but rather is born of it. As 
—. Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. (New York: Paulist Press, 
1989), 67. 
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such, from the very beginning to be a human person is to be oriented toward the 
other. It is to be inherently communal, social, political, and inter-dependent. The 
human person is driven by a capacity for relationship, an innate need to engage 
the other, to love and to be loved. The T does not exist without the 'y°u ' o r the 
intersubjective 'we'. 
The fundamental originality and uniqueness of, and equality among human 
persons, help us to understand the moral obligations which inform our common 
humanity. It speaks not only to the equality of persons, but also to the diversity 
among persons. It also tells us that as humans in the Trinitarian vision, each one of 
us is a unique reflection of the image of God. The expression of that gift is 
manifested in the dynamic movement towards living in full community with others. 
Our shared existence brings with it shared responsibility, and our interdependence 
leads to an awareness of justice. "Our pursuit of individual ends can be justified 
only to the extent that we respect the patterns of interdependence which make up 
our relational selves."66 For that reason, our moral choices ought to promote true 
community as a value, and demonstrate the type of self-giving which maintains it. 
' —. Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 
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The Clinical Implications 
Scientific and technological advances in the medical field have served the 
good of life. This claim is statistically supported by the decline in infant mortality 
rates, the increase in life expectancy and in the control and eradication of many 
diseases which would once have been fatal. Today, medical science affords us a 
considerable control over life and death that was unimaginable a few decades ago. 
Conversely, these same advances have presented us with new dilemmas that 
would have been inconceivable then. Advances in the study of genetics make it 
possible to test and diagnose a foetus with a genetic defect, giving rise to the 
possibility of our deciding whether it should be born. Life-sustaining technology 
allows us to maintain vital bodily functions by mechanical means for progressively 
longer periods of time. New abilities compel us to pose new questions. Should we 
make great effort to preserve and protect the life of a newborn infant who suffers 
from physical or cognitive deficiencies, or that of someone who is terminally ill 
simply because we can? In effect, we are now forced to choose who should live 
and who should die, virtually determining which lives are worth saving and which 
are not. Medical science and new technologies may have radically changed the 
way the healing arts are practiced. However, the human will to health and 
happiness remains the same. 
The particularly pressing problems of clinical ethics today are not merely 
technological or scientific, but also relational. Science and technology do play an 
important role in health care and do present complex and difficult challenges. 
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However, at their very core, these are the challenges of vulnerable persons in 
need and the persons that care for them. The challenge is in how to respond to an 
ever-changing world that respects the person and her humanity. The problems of 
birth and death, illness and injury are not just events that doctors attend to, but 
rather experiences in every person's life to which medical professionals bear 
witness. The doctor as an expert makes decisions with the hope of benefitting the 
patient, a human person coming to her birth, his death or seeking release from 
illness and injury. 
Ethics, Lonergan reminds us, is knowing and doing the good: a knowing 
and doing which flows from being attentive to the data of experience; being 
intelligent in our drive to understand that which is experienced; being reasonable in 
judging the truth of what is understood; being responsible in deciding what ought to 
be done. Thus, a doctor in deliberating what is in the best interest of the patient, is 
attentive to the patient as one person to another. He endeavours to understand the 
meaning of the human life at whose beginning and end he is present, as he 
reflects on the treatment and acts in attending to its distress. He does not simply 
diagnose and treat disease, he heals persons. 
Clinical ethics not only deals with medical problems, but also addresses the 
vital and moral human challenges of birth, life, suffering and death. It speaks to the 
universal human condition at its most vulnerable, and more so during the moments 
when our continued bodily existence is brought into question - when we 
encounter, face-to-face, our own mortality. In this wider context, the relationship 
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between patient as person and doctor as person is one which encompasses all 
who have had, or will have to deal with death and disease. Medical ethics, then, is 
consonant with the ethics of a wider human community. And as such, the ethical 
imperatives governing the relationship between doctor and patient are the same as 
those that govern any relationship between persons.67 
Earlier in this study, we have established that human intersubjectivity is 
experienced in relation to the other, and within that relationship is the locus of our 
encounter with the embodied spirit. It is also there that we encounter the 
undifferentiated collective consciousness: the collective 'we' that precedes the 
individual ' I ' . This collective 'we' is evident in the pre-cognitive, spontaneous 
intersubjectivity that the human person experiences, and out of which all 
intersubjectivities flow. It forms the foundation of all human relationships and is 
where the practice of medicine and its ethic can find direction. 
There is no criterion or condition of personhood that is useful in determining 
what a person is without personal engagement. This adverts to a unique quality of 
our humanity, which is the ability to recognize and to know each other in a way that 
other creatures do not. We are essentially directed toward the other, and in our 
Paul Ramsey, "Preface to The Patient as Person." in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives 
in Medical Ethics. Stephen E. Lammers, and Allen Verhey eds. (Cambridge, U.K.: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), 53. 
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encounter with the other we encounter the embodied soul - the incarnate spirit - of 
the other. 
This is true of all personal encounters and especially important when we are 
in the presence of the most vulnerable among us. For clinical ethics, this notion 
has far-reaching implications. The case of Janet that was recounted at the 
beginning of this study aptly demonstrates many of the complexities of the end of 
life decision-making process we might encounter. Apparently, Janet's capacity for 
relationship is irreversibly lost, therefore we can say that she no longer participates 
in, or enjoys human life in a personal way. However, she is pregnant at the time of 
her death, and for the next eight weeks her essential bodily functions were 
maintained so that her child could be born. Janet became a mother two months 
after being declared legally dead. 
For her caregivers, the challenge of caring for Janet must have been 
significant. However, the humanity with which she was cared for points to the 
fundamental power of the human encounter with the embodied spirit of the other. 
Stuart Youngner speaks of the cognitive dissonance experienced by Janet's 
caregivers. Intellectually, they knew that Janet was deceased, but at a deeper level 
they felt she was alive: some even sensed the presence of a soul in her body. 
Janet was loved and cared for. Those around her spoke to her, dressed her and 
bathed her. Her family watched the living body of a dead girl nurture, grow, and 
issue forth a healthy baby. Janet's spirit was revealed in the miracle of birth. This 
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revelation 'is not an object to be apprehended', Lonergan tells us, but rather acts 
on our subjectivity. 
As I stated earlier, the summit of authentic human experience is an 
intersubjectivity - a communion of spirit with the other. Although Janet was no 
longer capable of intentionally engaging the world around her for the last few 
weeks of her life, the world around her continued to engage her in her life=giving 
endeavour. This encounter is not unlike that of a mother and her unborn child. It 
may seem to be unreciprocated, but it is not. The mother cares for her unborn 
child, and the child responds by flourishing inside her. Janet had stated that should 
anything happen to her, she wanted the baby's life spared. Janet continued to 
express that wish for the eight weeks that her body nourished the baby which 
flourished inside her. This elicited a response that I can only describe as a vital 
intersubjectivity which flows out of the common consciousness of human beings as 
beings. 
During earlier discussion of this case, I asked, "What was Janet's ethical 
and legal status? What was the foetus' standing?" Brain death is a legal construct; 
therefore Janet was dead in the eyes of the law. Legally, she was no longer a 
person. However, through her bodily presence Janet continued to relate to those 
around her until she gave birth. At that moment she became a mother, her mother 
became a grandmother, and so on. The lives that she touched have been forever 
changed. 
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The law does not recognize the foetus as a person, but long before it was 
born those who would make up its matrix of relationships had already begun to 
define their relatedness. The early stages in creating the identity of a person within 
and as part of its emergent world are set in motion. As with Janet, when this baby 
came into being it changed the lives of those around it. Even though the legal 
personhood of Janet and her baby depended on their medical and legal condition, 
moral and ethical personhood is conferred by their relationality - their being. 
The most vulnerable among us are those who cannot communicate in 
conventional ways. Those persons who are unable to convey their wants and 
needs - the infants, the cognitively impaired, the physically or mentally 
compromised, and the comatose. As with all persons, they are part of the 
collective 'we' which underpins all human interaction. We have the capacity to 
interact or enter into relationship regardless of how compromised or minimal a 
person's consciousness appears to be. 
Meaning is conveyed in the smallest touch, gaze, expression or sound. 
Volumes can be spoken to those who would take the time to connect, to relate and 
to engage. When we are attentive to the other, we allow ourselves to experience 
the other experiencing their condition, to arrive at a better understanding of that 
experience. It allows us to connect to the angst and the pain that the other is 
feeling in the hope of alleviating some of their suffering. That same connection that 
causes one to spontaneously reach out to prevent the fall of another can convey 
empathy, hope, and compassion. It can reassure and relieve. 
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Technology has well served the good of health, but not without challenges. 
Persons are created to be in relationships that nurture and define them. However, 
the direct human connection between physician and patient is slowly giving way to 
machines and monitors. Increasingly, technology mediates that connection, 
thereby further alienating the patient from the caregivers. One need only visit an 
emergency room or intensive care unit at a local hospital to witness this. The 
space around many patients is filled with equipment, and the care providers can 
often be seen entering that space, engaging the machinery and leaving without 
taking a moment to connect with the patient. The resultant physical and emotional 
distance isolates the patient. 
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Conclusion 
"The sick person, however, does not exist in isolation: he or she is shaped 
by social, familial, religious or other kind of encompassing environment. If we want 
to respect someone's best interests, we have to consider the person in an integral 
way. This means we have to take a global approach."68 
One of the major differences that is apparent when comparing Dennett's 
fundamental conditions of personhood to Lonergan's characterization is in the 
language used. Dennett's fundamental conditions point to a list of criteria that are 
based on capacity. Dennett's conditions of personhood would have us believe that 
all persons are not necessarily human and all humans are not fully persons. I 
would argue that, as beings born in the image of God, we are relational human 
persons by our very creation. Responsibility and the ability to discern and act 
ethically is a central factor in Dennett's assessment and may be useful in legal 
matters. To hold persons responsible for their actions, they must be capable of 
forming the intent to act. In the clinical setting, certain persons are deemed 
incapable of making certain decisions with regard to their treatment, thus 
exempting them from an important element of personhood - autonomy and the 
Hubert Doucet, Death in Technological Society: An Ethical Reflection on Dying. Trans. Kenneth 
Russell (Ottawa: Novalis, 1992), 48. 
66 
exercise of their free-will - because of a developmental or mental defect or 
incapacity. This is done to protect and enhance their personhood, and not to 
diminish it. However, the logical conclusion of Dennett's conditional model, based 
on capacities, is that it necessarily excludes certain persons from important 
elements of personhood. It effectively renders some among us less-than-persons. 
It is an approach which holds that a being is a person because they have certain 
capabilities devoid of any sense of personhood as an intrinsic value, independent 
of capabilities. 
As recently as the twentieth century, we have seen abuses of similar 
capacity-based models that were used to justify involuntary sterilization of persons 
diagnosed as mentally deficient as part of eugenics programs. In Canada, 
between 1928 and 1972, citizens who were deemed to be "in danger of 
transmitting mental deficiency to their children, or incapable of intelligent 
parenthood" were sterilized by order of the Alberta Eugenics Board. Sixty-four 
persons received the same treatment in British Columbia. By 1960, more than 
60,000 persons said to be either mentally retarded or mentally ill were sterilized for 
eugenic purposes in thirty U.S. states. Britain, Germany and other European 
nations adopted similar policies. This is one chapter in a chronicle of human 
fallibility, of societies which would resort to extreme measures in support of 
67 
extreme theories, with the conviction that they were justified. In the twenty-first 
century, the next chapter is being written as we realize the potential of new genetic 
technologies.69 
I am not asserting that eugenics of this type is likely to occur in our day. 
However, with the potential that genetics holds for the future, and the notion that a 
person need not necessarily be human, there is cause for concern. Simply put, a 
capacity-based model fails to adequately consider or fully define the person. 
Lonergan approaches the subject from a different perspective. He speaks 
of persons as possessing certain attributes - human identity, human 
consciousness and human subjectivity. It is not because we possess certain 
capabilities that we are persons, rather we are persons who possess certain 
attributes. He also tells us that there exists a reciprocal human interaction or 
intersubjectivity that is vital, innate, or pre-intentional. He speaks of a person as a 
being becoming. A human being engaged in a dynamic process that is self-
constituting and creative. 
Relationality, and not rationality, is at the centre of our created reality and 
the essence of personhood. The patient, like all others, is a person being in the 
Deborah C. Park and John P. Radford. "From the Case Files: Reconstructing a History of 
Involuntary Sterilization." Disability & Society 13, no. 3 (June, 1998), 317-319. 
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world. Just as a person is in the natural or biological sense, a person is in the 
social or political sense. In order to consider the person in an integral way, one 
must acknowledge a matrix of relationships and narratives, be they personal, 
spatial or temporal that is at the very essence of the person's being. To deny this 
relatedness is to deny that person's very being. 
In the clinical setting, the health-care providers are duty-bound to act in the 
best interest of the sick and vulnerable persons in their charge. Admittedly, it is 
not always easy to discern what the best interest of a particular person, in a 
particular situation, is. However, by adequately considering the dimensions of the 
person as a relational, embodied and historical being, we minimize the risk of 
dehumanizing the sick and vulnerable among us. 
It has also served to distance the patient from the traditional personal 
connection to the health-care system. The effect is a depersonalization of the 
system and the persons whom it serves. The notion of patient-as-person is not a 
new one, but in today's world of market-driven healthcare, with all the stresses and 
strains that limited resources place on the systems that support it, the challenge is 
to turn the notion into a reality. A good place to start might be if within a 
supercharged system, we were to take a moment to be attentive to the experience 
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